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CONGRESS

Every modern state sets apart a body of men to make the
"laws" and relies for the execution of these laws, on another set
of men. This circumstance secures to the latter the power of
nullifying the law by refusing to perform the actions necessary to
enforce it. The causes for this refusal might be various, e. g., want
of sympathy with the ends contemplated by the law, or jealousy
of the law-making body, or a belief that the law is inconsistent
with the Constitution. If many executive officers were disposed
lo accept orders from the president or other chief executive officer
an intimation from him, openly or secretly, that he did not want
the law carried out, would reduce it to ineptitude. Certain executive acts, e. g., those of a marshall or sheriff in execution of the
judgment of a court, are performed only in obedience to a court.
The court's refusal to honor the act of congress by giving the
necessary judgment and issuing the execution, would secure the
refusal of these officers to lend assistance to it.
Now, it is quite evident, that the constitution which separates
the legislative from the executive power becomes unworkable ;f
those who wield the latter are unwilling loyally to execute the
legislation of the former. Law without enforcement is vain. In
the United States, the executive officers, even the highest, have put
forth no pretension that they may for any reason, refuse to carry
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out a statute. The person who is president when a bill is passed,
has a veto upon it, but when, in the forms of the constitution, it
becomes law, neither he nor his successors claim the right to deny
enforcement to it because, in their opinion, it exceeds the constitutional power of Congress.
The courts, however, who are a part of the executive machinery of the country, have refused to cooperate in the execution of
a law except under the condition that it is, in their opinion consonant with the constitution. They do not pretend that they may
thus annul it, because they do not agree with congress with respect to its wisdom or its justice. They say, however, that they
are not concluded by the opinion of congress as to its conformity
with the constitution and that forming their own judgment on
this point, they may not merely decline to assist in, but may actually prohibit or penalize, the execution of it, should that judgment 'be adverse.
It is not pretended that the constitution confers this power
,n the courts in explicit terms. It bestows on them judicial
power, just as it bestows on the president and the various executive officers. high and low. the executive power. Their work is
smiply a section of the work of. execution. When the president
does certain things in the carrying out of a law, he must decide
whether it is a law. He has sworn to support the constitution.
There is always a possibility that the law transgresses that instrument. But he doe- not arrogate a power to ignore the statute on
his own personal view of its constitutionality. Inferior executive
officers. e. z. the be..ds of the departments. collectors of internal
revenue, collectors of the ports. marshalls. are equally modest. It.
does not occur to them to refuse obedience to a statute because they
think it void. Yet they are bound to obey the constitution, and, if
an unconstitutional law is no law. if it confers no rights, confers
no duitie,. affords no Drotection 1 it would seem that they are as
much inqtified in reffusine to carry out any law until. comuaring it
with the constitution. they have convinced themselves that it is
valid, as is a court.whieh is engaged in the task of execution but
-it another stage.
There is. however, this remarkable difference between the
court and the other executive officers. 3'f the latter carry out a
law. and a court should later declare it void, they may be punished
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425.
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as tort-feasors, possibly as criminals; and if, fearful that it i
unconstitutional, they refuse to carry it out, and the court should
afterwards hold it valid, they may again be punished for tort or
crime, whereas, courts in carrying out or in refusing to carry out
statutes, have contrived to escape this responsibility. The citizen,
the executive officer, must act at his peril. There is no way by
which he can learn in advance, whether the law is sound or unsound. He must heed it, or disregard it, and in either case, possibly incur a heavy liability.
Enjoying this perfect impunity which they have invented for
themselves, courts may refuse, without risk, to enforce statutes, on
the pretence that they do not think them constitutional.
There are four general ways in which courts might exert their
power of declaring acts unconstitutional. (a) They might declare
bills unconstitutional before their transition into "law." (b) They
might prevent the execution of the law by injunction, mandamus,
habea.s corpus, or other process directed to an officer, or an unofficial person. (c) They might entertain suits for damages for acts
(lone by officers or others in pursuance of an unconstitutional stattite. (d) In suits by A to enforce a right granted by a statute, or in
Quits by A, in which the state furnishes B, the defendant with a
defence, they might decline to recognize the right or the soundness
ot the defence.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 made the President a
part of the law making body by requiring the submission of every
bill to him. It expressly declined to require the report of a bill to
the judiciary for its approbatory action. This, probably, was the
result of their unwillingness to allow courts in any form to have
the power to sit in judgment on the propriety of statutes. It could
hardly -have been their thought that the judgment of the judges to
whom a bill was submitted, should not be conclusive upon their successors on the same bench, and that for this reason, it would be
comparatively useless to require those who happened to be on the
bench at the period of the enactment, to partake therein. 1t is incredible that the framers of the Constitution contemplated the possibility that one set of judges might denounce a law as void, and
a later set affirm its validity, and a still later set revert to the attitude of the first. But on the other hand, it is difficult to understand, if the members of the convention intended the judges once to
express a judzrment on the law, why they did not provide for this
expression at its initiation.
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Is it said that it is better that the opinion should be expressed
in the ordinary course of litigation? The objections to this method
are serious. Instead of some public agency eliciting the judicial
opinion, it would be a private litigant. Years may elapse before
the case is made and meantime the statute has seemed to be law
and has been widely submitted to as law. The counsel employed)
may inadequately attack or defend the statute. The decision will
bind nobody else than the parties, not even the court. The same
question may be recontested as often as enterprising suitors or lawyers choose. and there may result a series of inharmonious decisions
from the same court. The same act has in fact been declared void 1,
and, in a later suit, Valid, and after acts involving a certain principle have been repeatedly held valid another involving the same
principle has been denounced as void. 2
It may be true that the unconstitutionality of an act may not
be discoverable until a searching analysis of its provisions has been
made and the various possible results of their applications have
been realized, and that this is impossible by the imagination alone.
But, the logical result of this consideration would be that a statute
may be obeyed by citizens or enforced by executive officers and by
courts, for years before its unconstitutionality may be discerned
The number of questionable statutes is always extremely smal, and
it would be possible to secure a reasonably thorough sifting of them
before they were allowed to become ostensible law by the aid of
jurists appointed for that purpose. The expense would be insignificant, in comparison with the loss occasioned by the present method.
A so-called preventive jurisdiction exists in the courts, that
which is exerted by means of an injunction, or a writ of prohibition.
Tt would not be irrational to extend this method to -the enactment of
statutes believed by a suitor and by the court to be unconstitutional.
If X is aware of the pendency of a bill in Congress which will
seriously affect his interests and, which he believes to be unconstitutional, why may he not file a bill in the court asking that officers
oft congress concerned in the legislation, be enjoined from promoting it?
The very suggestion of such an injunction will doubtless seem
absurd. It seemed absurd to the mind of Chief Justice Chase when
lie said "it will hardly be contended that the court can interfere to
2 Legal Tender Cases.
2 The Income Tax Cases.
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restrain the enactment of an unconstitutional law"' and Harlan J.,
says 2that even in enjoining the councils of a city from passing
unconstitutional ordinances, the courts will "pass the line that separates judicial from legislative authority. The passage of ordinances by such bodies are (sio) legislative acts which a court of
equity will not enjoin."
But, the courts will forbid B's doing an act which he is com,nanded by A to do. It will sometimes forbid A's commanding him
to do it. But, what is legislation but A's command to B, C, D, E,
er F? By supposition, the legislative body has'no right to enact
the law in question. Its perogatives would not be infringed by a
court's forbidding it to do what the people in their constitution,
have already forbidden it to do.
To say that the act is "legislative" as does Harlan, J., and there.fore will not be enjoined is to say nothing. It is not legislative if
it is void, and why cannot an illegal legislative act be forbidden, as
much as an illegal executive act? The former leads to the latter. If
the commanded effect may be prevented, why may the command to
produce the effect not be prevented? Only those who take words
for things can see the reason.
Will it be said that the number of legislators to be enjoined
will be great? It will. If the end to be gained is important enough
how can this matter? Is an important right to be left defenceless
because of the mechanical inconvenience of the proposed method of
securing it?
The real objection is far different. The courts have been conscious that their power to declare acts of congress void, has not been
always acquiesced in by members of congress. They were obliged
to begin cautiously and in ways that did not provoke resistance.
Had they attempted to forbid the legislators themselves, the latter
might, probably would, have defied them. A method less beneficial
to the public but more likely to spare the court from discomfiture,
was bit upon. A case between private persons involving the constitutionality of an act of congress may not be made up for years.
The congress that enacted it is no longer in power. If it is, it ha-4
lost its interest in the question. It does not feel as keenly a judgment of annulment, obtained in this obscure way, as it would, had
it been made a party defendant, and had the court launched against
'Mississippi

v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475.

2New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans. 164 U. S. 471.
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it its compulsive order. Though at first a little startled by the assmnption of the right to annul statutes, the country and congress
have grown used to it. Had the more direct, the bolder and the
more hbnest method been employed at first, the experiment would
probably have been fatal to the court, and it would have failed
altogether to acquire the power which by its prudence it has now
consolidated.
I-lad it been clear that the constitution makers really intended
that tie courts should have the power to annul acts of congress it
would be derogatory to the latter to impute to it an unwillingness
to submit to the tutelage of its mentors. An unconstitutional law
ought not to be enacted. The edict of the court would save the inncocent and ignorant legislators from the commission of a blunder
which, disparaging their own constitutional sense, would also be
disastrous to the millions of people who would seem to be affected
hy it. It is to be presumed that congress has perspicacity enough
to discern that it is in fact as much humiliated when its executive
egents are forbidden to carry out its statutes, or are mulcted i-i
dsmnages because they have carried them out, as it would be, were
its attempt arrested to give the apparent virtue of law to its bills.
Its honor would welcome the latter inasmuch as innocent humble
executive officers and citizens would in that way escape being made
to suffer vicariously for it.
It is suggested that for the court to enjoin the enactment of
laws by congress, would be for it to assert a superiority over congress. So it would. But, that is precisely what the court mu.-t
assert when it declares in any form an act of congress void. How
can it matter, so far as coordinateness or subordinateness is concerned, whether the court prevents the passage of the statute, or
brands it., passed, as void. and both refuses itself, and forbids citizens or executive officers, to give the statute obedience? The arrogation of superiority is the same in both cases. What does congress gain by being allowed to "pass" an act, if, as soon as it is
passed, execution of it is paralyzed by prohibitions, pains and pennlties?
Indeed. the courts have themselves occasionally perceived that
to refuse execution to an act of legislation is substantially the same
thing as to restrain the enactment itself. In Cherokee Nation v.
State of Georgia,1 the Nation filed a bill in the Supreme Court
'5 Peters, 1;

quoted approvingly in Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U. S. 50.

THE FORUM

177

against the governor of Georgia, the attorney-general, the judges,
etc. to forbid their carrying out statutes whereby Georgia extended
its jurisdiction over the lands and the persons and property of the
Indians. Declining to entertain it because the plaintiff was neither
a state nor a foreign state, Marshall, C. J., remarks, as an additional objection, that "it seeks to restrain a state from the forcible exercise of legislative power over a neighboring people asserting their
independence, their right to which the state denies * * * * The bill
requires us to control the legislature of Georgia and to restrain the
exertion of its physical force."
"It will hardly be contended" says Chief Justice Chase I"that
the court can interfere in any case, to restrain the enactment of an
unconstitutional law, and yet how can the right to judicial interposition to prevent such an enactment, when the purpose is evident,
and the execution of that purpose certain, be distinguished in principle, from the right to such interposition against the execution
of such a law by the President?" As prohibiting execution by the
President is only a somewhat more comprehensive and complete
prohibition than that of minor executive officers, this remark, if it
means anything, must mean that, to prevent execution is as objectionable as to prevent enactment, of a statute. It surely is, but the
logical result ought to be that, if the court cannot do the latter, it
cannot do the former.
Is it suggested that congress would at this day disobey the
court's injunction, and the latter would be powerless to enforce submission? Several answers are possible. (a) For nearly 90 years,
Congress has witnessed with meekness the assumption by the court
of the power to declare its legislation void. It apparently concedes
the right of the court thus to do. If it does, it could have no particular motive to object to the prompter, and to the public more
advantageous, method of preventing the improper enactment. To
suspect that, resignedly acquiescing in the annulment of statutes
enacted, it would resist the attempt to prevent it from enacting
them, is to impugn its good sense. It can surely attach no importance to the right of voting a law into being, which is instantly to
be stricken by the courts with death. (b) If the court really has
the power to prevent the passage of a void act, it would be to impeach the patriotism of congress, to believe it capable of resisting
I Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475.
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the exercise of it.' (c) The disobedience of the injunction would
be immaterial, for the court would have condemned the law, and
citizen and officer would know in advance that it was void.
It is deeply to be regretted, since courts will pronounce acts of
congress void, that they have not arrested them before promulgation as law. Once enacted, they seem to cast duties on citizens and
officers. Loss and risk are absolutely inevitable, if their fate in
the court is at all doubtful, whether they shall be subsequently sustained or not, for some citizens will conclude that they are good.
others that they are bad, and will behave accordingly. But there
is no likelihood that the method that would minimize the mischief
caused by declaring acts unconstitutional, will now be adopted.
The losses incident to the methods in vogue do not fall upon the
court, and citizens must accept such as fall on them as the inevitable
consequences of living under the only government that allows its
courts to set at naught acts of legislation that have passed with all
constitutional forms.
The courts will not renounce the power of declaring acts of
Congress void. They will not prevent the formal enactment of
them. It follows that they must, in some way, arrest their execution. One way of arresting the execution of a statute, would be to
enjoin the officer who was about to execute it. Certain acts require
the agency of the President. In certain contingencies his aid may
bveome necessary in any case; even that of carrying out a judgment of a court. If the court should enjoin the President from carrying out a statute it would more effectively, more quickly, over a
wider area. arrest it than in any other way. Will, then the court
enjoin the President?
In Mlississippi v. Johnson 2 an- attempt was made to prevent the
execution within Mississippi of the Reconstruction Acts, by a bill
filed in the Supreme Court against Andrew Johnson, president, and
Gen. E. 0. C. Ord, commanding in the military district. The court,
refused to entertain the bill for reasons, three in number, that are
noteworthy.
(a) The work of the president, it was said was "executive,"
and not "ministerial." No specific acts were required to be done
'Something similar was said by Davis, J., of the President, when it was
suggested that he had probably hung Miligan in execution of the sentence
of a military court, despite his appeal on habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court; Exparte Miligan, 71 U. S. 2.
271 U..S. 475.
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by him. He had discretion. The court could not displace his discretion by its own. The answe to this was.easy. If the Recoistruction Acts were constitutional, the president did indeed have a
discretion.
Tuinberless alternative acts would have fulfilled his
duties under them. His was the power of selection. But, what if
these acts of Congress were void? Then he had no discretion. The
only authority for doing any of them was they. Without them,
any act by him of the sort about to be attempted, would have been
illegal. He had the physical power to do it, but so has a murderer
to kill, or a thief to steal. The act being unconstitutional, he had
no discretion. To the suggestion however, that the court was not
asked to enforce action "but to restrain such action under legislation alleged to be unconstitutional," the reply vouchsafed by the
Chief Justice is "But we are unable to- perceive that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principle which forbids
judicial interference with the exercise of executive discretion."
The Chief Justice could not see a difference between having a right
to effect a certain end, by means freely chosen, and having no right
to effect that end by any means at all!
Suppose an unconstitutional tax law, giving to the taxing officer the choice of means to compel the payment of the tax. He would
have a discretion, were the law valid, of which no court could deprive him. But the law is void. Would the court refuse to enjoin
him against collecfing the tax, because he had a "discretion?" He
haq no discretion. His duty is to refrain from anything done to
enforce the payment of the tax. It was Andrew Johnson's duty
to refrain from doing anything towards the enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts, if they were unconstitutional.
(b) The next reason assigned by C. J. Chase is equally remarkable. In eighty years, he says, no injunction against the president
had been asked for, and he makes the puerile suggestion that during the agitation for the annexation of Texas, there would have
been motive to seek an injunction, had it been believed practicable,
but "no one seems to have thought of it." No other occasion for
desiring to enjoin the president is mentioned. Is it not enough to
reply to this logic, that every kind of thing is once done for the
first time; that annexation is a "political" question with regard to
which the courts disavow the desire or power to differ from the
"political departments" so that for this reason, lawyers knew that
the bill if filed would be unsuccessful,' and that the supposition that

'Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 253; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202.
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the failure of somebody to file a bill in 1845, is proof, not only that
no body then believed the possibility of sustaining such a bill, but
that what no body then believed possible was then, and is now impossible. is in the last degree fatuous.
(c) The last reason of the Chief Justice is still more remarkable. The court, he suggests, cannot restrain the enactment of a
law, "and yet" he asks, how can the right to do this "be distinguished in principle from the right to such interposition against
the execution of a law by the President?" To enjoin the President
froi executing a law is the same thing as to enjoin Congress from
passing it. This statement is far from self-evidencing, and the ipse
di.et of the justice is its only warrant. But what does it mean?
That injuction against carrying out a law is not permissible? Injunction has been repeatedly employed as a means of preventing the
carrying out of a void law, and has been directed against a collector
or other agent employed in assessing or collecting taxes I against a
city, to prevent the taking of land under an unconstitutional ordinance 2 against a corporation to prevent its voluntarily paying an
income tax 3 and in other cases. If an officer is to be liable if he
enforces an unconstitutional statute it is surely preferable that he
should be prevented from, rather than penalized for, executing it.
The court, the Chief Justice doubtless intends to say, cannot
enjoin the President in any case. But why? The first reason given
is that it would be equivalent to enjoining Congress. This is somewhat recondite. The two are not the same. The latter legislates,
the former presides over execution. But in essence, what difference
is there between enjoining an inferior executive, and enjoining a
superior executive? The object in both is to prevent enforcement
of the law. If that is a worthy object, is it right to realize it partially and wrong to realize it fully'? Right to prevent execution at
one or two or six places and occasions, but wrong to prevent it at
all places and occasions?
The second reason assigned by the Chief Justice is that the
President, Congress and the judiciary are co-ordinate and distinct
departments. But as legislative power exists in order that effects
may be produced. and as these effects are produced not immediate-

, Union

Pacific Railway Co. v. Ryan, 113 U. S. 516;

'Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207; Dobbins v.
Los Angeles, 95 U. S. 223;
$Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 602.
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ly by Congress but by the executive department, of which the
courts are a branch, the courts in forbidding even inferior officeiu
or citizens from executing statutes, or in refusing, in suits before
them, to give effect to duties or rights defined by statutes, are asserting a superiority to Congress. It is puerile to suppose that the
attempt to enjoin the President is a worse invasion of his rights or
the rights of Congress, than the injunction of inferior officers
through whom both Congress and the President are to realize their
obiects.
The third reason is equally notable. Suppose the President refuses obedience to the injunction. The court cannot fine and imprison him. He is too strong to be subject to punishment; therefore he cannot be the subject of an injunction. To this it may be
replied: since the court is ex hypothesi the judge of constitutionality, and since the President knows that it is, it is injurious to
him to suppose that he would disobey the court. To do so is to
accuse him of lawlessness. The advice of the court would doubtless
be welcomed by him, and he would obey it with alacrity. But, if
he obeyed, replies the Chief Justice, he might be impeached by Congress. But is not that insinuation injurious to Congress? Does not
Congress know that the court is the final judge of constitutionality?
And is it so anarchic, that it would pumish the President with deposal for obedience to this sovereign court? And why should it
direct its batteries against the President, conscious as it would be,
that the court, not he, was the prime offender? But if, as experience shows, congress submits gracefully to interference by the
court with the execution of its laws, when the president's agency
has not intervened, why should it be specially angry, because the
court in some particular case, accomplishes this nullification, by
putting the president in subjection to its behest?
Precisely how exalted the-officer must be, to exempt him from
the court's injunction, we do not know. Next below the president
are the members of the cabinet, but it seems not to have been doubted that they could be compelled to do, or to refrain from doing,
things by an order of a court. That the secretary of state,' the
postmaster general,2 the secretary of the interior,3 the secretary of
'Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137.
2Kendall vs. United Stats, 12 Peters 617.
3 United
States vs. Schurz, 102 U. S. '378.
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the navy,' the secretary of war 2 the secretary of the treasury3 are
subject to mandamus, when the thing to be done is not discretionary is clear. It was affirmed that Madison, secretary of state under
President Jefferson could be compelled to deliver a commission,
although the secretary was acting under the order of the president
in withholding it. What would the court have done, if any of
these great officers had refused obedience to the court's command.
The postmaster general by an order could cause or defeat.the execution by thousands of his subordinates of an unconstitutional law,
and it would be highly convenient to the people where the law is
unconstitutional, to have its execution arrested simultaneously
eyerywhere. by means of an injunction addressed to him. In
Georgia v. Stanton, 4 a second effort was made by the state to prevent the execution of the reconstruction acts, by enjoining the seeretary of war from assisting in carrying them into execution, but
again the court escaped a decision upon the law, not however by
holding that secretary Stanton was too big an officer to be enjoined, but by the principle that as the defense only of political
and not property rights, was sought by the bill, equity could not
give relief. The court was determined to avoid a collision witih
Congress.
The propriety of forbidding an act by a superior officer on
which depends the efforts of many inferior officers, to carry out an
unconstitutional law, has been more than once recognized. In,
Fargo vs. Hart,5 an injunction to the state auditor, forbidding his
certifying assessments of taxes on the property of an express company, to the auditors of -the various counties of the state, on the
ground that the assesments were unconstitutional, was justified
by Holmes, J., by the consideration that "It avoids the necessity
of suits against the officers of each of the counties of the state."
The timidity of the court with regard to its ability to enforce
its orders has doubtless been confirmed by certain disagreeable
experiences. In Worcester v. Georgia,.6 it reversed a conviction of
Worcester under a state statute by a state court, but fearful that
'Decatur

vs. Paulding, 14 Peters 497.

2 United States vs. Lamont, 155 U. S. 308.
3United States vs. 'Windom, 137 U. S. 636.
473 U. S. 50
-193 U. S. 490. Cf. Adams Express Company vs. Ohio State Auditor, 165
U. S. 194.
6 Peters, 515.
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its own officers would be powerless to secure the liberation of the
defendant, remitted the record to the state court with a direction
to that court to liberate him. That court refused, and since military power would have been necessary to compel obedience, and
since President Jackson was unwilling to lend such power, the
judgment of the court was successfully defied.' In other cases,
Georgia had hung two men, pending a writ of error from the Supreme Court, which was a supersedeas. 2 Shortly before the Civil
War, Kentucky applied to the Supreme Court of the United States
for a mandamus upon Dennison, governor of Ohio, to compel him
to surrender .a fugitive from justice. The crime had been persuading a slave to escape. In order apparently to avoid having to
grant the mandamus, when it would certainly be defied, the court
came to the preposterous conclusion that when Congress, in the
act of 1793, declared "it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall have fled.
to cause him or her to be arrested and secured * * * and to be delivered up," the duty thus declared was not a legal duty, nor could
it be enforced even by a mandamus.8 In Marbury v. Madison, 4
after roundly lecturing Jefferson, President, and Madison, Secretary of State, Chief Justice Marshall skillfully avoided launching
the mandamus, by the opportune discovery that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be enlarged by Congress.
Instead of dismissing the case as he should have done for want of
jurisdiction, he seized the opportunity to condemn the action of
the executive without incurring the risk of defiant disobedience.
A still more flagrant case of timidity is that of Ex part,
McCardle. 5 MIcCardle had been arrested by military authority, in
Mississippi, for libel, under the Reconstruction acts. These acts
subjected him to trial by a military court. He applied for a habeav
corpvs to the Circuit Court of the United States, which remanded
him to military custody. He appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The court was urged to dismiss the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. It announced that it had jurisdiction and
heard the cause on the merits. "The majority of the Supreme

IBaldwin,
2

The American Judiciary, p. 294.
Baldwin, The American Judiciary, p. 164.
sKentucky v. Dennison, 24 Howard, 66; Baldwin, The American Judiciary, p. 296.
41 Cr. 137.
573 I. S. 318.
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Court" says Foster 1"held that at least so much of the act was unconstitutional as deprived citizens of the United States of the
right of trial by jury." Did they liberate McCardle? Congres',
was in no mood to brook the nullification of its Reconstruction
policy. It might resort to impeachment should the court oppose
its plans. "The court," says Foster, "hesitated to engage in a conflict with a co-ordinate department of the government upon a question of so great a political importance, and consequently, against
the protest of two of their number,2 postponed their decision until
the succeeding term, in order to afford Congress an opportunity to
repeal the statute that gave them jurisdiction." The statute was accordingly repealed, and McCardle was left exposed to an unconstitutional conviction, although the court had had the power for a whole
year to liberate him as it believed he should be. An astonishing
feature of this case is the disingenuous and callous remark of Chief
Justice Chase, in dismissing the appeal. "It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this
case. for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal, and judicial
duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction
(that is jurisdiction which, once granted, has been withdrawn
upon private suggestion to congress from the court) than in exercising firmly (!) that which the constitution and the laws confer."
This suspicion of the courts, that their power of declaring
acts of congress unconstitutional would, if exerted too directly
upon Congress or the President, cause them embarrassment, has
unfortunately induced them to resort to more covert, and for citizens, less desirable methods of annulling statutes. The existing
usage is, to enjoin inferior officers from executing statutes; to hold
them pecuniarily liable for acts done under void statutes; to enjoin
citizens, and to make them liable, and in suits before them in
which rights are asserted, based on unconstitutional law, to deny
the rights in the judgment or decree that may be rendered. These
methods are the least efficient for the early retirement of a statute
from the role of law, and adherence to them exposes the public co
the grave inconvenience and wrong incident to the absence for
years of any means for certainly learning whether what purports
to be a law, is law in fact.
What courts may declare acts of Congress unconstitutional? If it is of the essence of judicial duty, so to
1

The Constitution, p. 263.

2 They were Justices Field and Grier.

THE

FORUM

185

declare, as Chief Justice Marshall asserted in Marbury vs. Madison, it follows that any court, however humble, however few the
men that compose it, and however unlearned, must sit in judgment
on the acts of Congress that come before- it for application, and if,
in its opinion they are unconstitutional, it must declare them void.
Occasionally judges of superior courts, scandalized by the spectacle of an ignorant justice of the peace, in some rustic neighborhood, undertaking to annul a federal statute, have intimated that
judges of obscure courts should not presume to question the validity
of statutes.' But extravagance of the judicial pretension to sit in
judgment on. the acts of Congress must always be a mere matter of
degree. What more ridiculous than a court of common pleas of
one unlearned man, declaring an act of congress void, unless it be
a similar decision by a bucolic justice. The largest court in the
country is composed of but nine judges, and usually acts are declared uriconstitutional by but five of these, who are contradicted
by the other four. The act may have been passed by the unanimous
vote of more than four hundred members of the two houses and
approved by the President on the advice of his attorney general
and yet it can be nullified by a majority of one judge. And sometimes the five who nullify it do not agree as to what the defect of
the statute is. One may think it violates this clause of the constitution, and another that; and in fact the act may be condemned
for a flaw which but one man thinks he has discovered; for if A
thinks it violates clause m, and B clause n, and C clause o, and D
Clause p, and E clause g, and the five agree to brand it as void, is
it not clear that the act is overturned on the judgment of one man ?2
The rule is often laid down that the court should not denounce
a law as constitutional, unless it is clearly so. "We proceed upon
the rule" says Brewer, J., "often expressed in this court, that an
act of Congress is to be accepted as constitutional unless on ex'Cf. Cooley Const. Linm. 230. In United States v. Sheve, 1 Baldwin
510, during the trial of a defendant for forging a note of the bank of the
United States, his counsel undertook to convince the jury, as judge of the
law as well as of the fact, that the act of Congress by which the bank
was Incorporated, was unconstitutional If juries are judges of the law,
absurd as it seems, they have as good a right to pronounce on the constitutionality of a statute, as has a court. Cf. Baldwin, American Judiciary,
p. 190.
-A county court may declare a state law a violation of the federal
constitution; Lent vs. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316.
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amination, it clearly appears to be in conflict with the provisions
of the federal constitution."' "The opposition between the constitut.ion and law should be such" said Marshall, C. J., "that the judge
feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with
each other." 2 Said Chief Justice Waite, "Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and- this continues until
the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. One branch of
the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without
danger." 3
A careful examination of the cases in which acts of congress
have been pronounced unconstitutional negatives the actual observanc, by the courts of this rule. After Congress and the President
have concluded that an act is constitutional, an investigator would
have a singular mind that would feel -a clear and strong conviction
that they were wrong. The phrases of the constitution are vague
and abstract. Some of them it is extremely difficult to harmonize.
Even the standard of construction and interpretation is unsettled.
Must we find out what the members of the federal convention
meant? Or what the members of the ratifying state conventions
meant? Or what the majorities of the adult males in the states
meant? Or what the present people of the, states would probably
mean if they were adopting the constitution? There are several
cases which have rejected the intentions of the adopters of the constitution as decisive of its present meaning. In Fort Leavenworth
Railroad company vs. Lowe 4 it is boldly said that the framers of
the constitution believed that "witho-,t the consent of the states
the new government would not be abl,, to acquire lands within
them." *We moderns have discovered their mistake!
-A study of the opinions filed in different cases or in the same
case. makes certitude as to the meaning of the contested portions
of the constitution for a rational mind impossible. In the great
cases, how skilful the arguments of the judges on both sides; how
cogent the facts; how strong the cited authorities! Let one study
the opinions in the Dred Scott Case, the Legal Tender Cases, the
Income Tax Cases, the Insular Cases, and he will realize how futile
'Fairbank vs. United
four judges dissented.
'Fletcher vs. Peck, 6
S. 407; Cf. Cooley Const.
3,Sinking Fund Cases,

States, 181 U. S. 283.

Yet In this very case

Cranch 128; Livingston vs. Darlington, 101 U.
Lim. 252.
99 U. S. 718; Powell vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S.

114 U. S. 525 Cf. Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 19 Howard 393.
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it is to expect any certainty, when so much can be said for each of
the contending views. Let him further consider the veering of
the court, now towards an affirmation, now toward a denial, of the
validity of the statute. Let him note the lamentable contradiction
between the decisions in respect to several transcendently important questions. Let him duly weigh the circumstance that a constitutional case is never decided by an unanimous court; that usually
there are three, and very frequently four dissenters. How can any
one outside of the court feel any certainty that the view of the, six
or the five was sounder than that of the three or the four, especially
whei, the authority of the minority is fortified by that of the congress and the president that enacted the statute? Still more extraordinary is it that any judge who, being in the arena, is a party
to the conflict within the court and who becomes directly impressed
by the sentiments of his associates, should be willing to admit to
others or even to pretend to himself, that he is sure that his version of the constitution is the correct one. The human mind abates
somewhat of its confidence in itself when it perceives that other
minds equally able, and sincere, and with equal opportunity to
acquire the data for judgment, have reached opposite conclusions.
One of the canons laid down by Judge Cooley' as worthy of
observance in deciding whether legislative acts are constitutional,
is thus expressed, "Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass
upon a constitutional question, and decide a statute to be invalid
unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause." This rule though supported by several
decisions of state courts,. it would be extremely difficult to justify.
The inconvenience to the public of ignorance whether so-called
laws are in fact laws, is so serious as exigently to dictate the very
opposite. rule. Instead of waiting until avoidance of the decision
is impossible, courts should welcome the first opportunity to pronounce it. Their primary duty is towards the people. Sparing
the susceptibilities of congress, preserving a ceremonial show of
deference for that body, which is often not in fact felt, is not
nearly so worthy an object as relieving the people from harassing
and ruinous doubt concerning the law to which they must accom2
modate their conduct. In one notable instance at least the Supreme Court has decided the unconstitutionality of an act of con'Const. Lrm. 231.
Dred Scott vs. Sandford, 19 Howard 393.
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gress, when the solution of the problem before it, did not make
I
such decision necessary.
Another rule is suggested by Judge Cooley,' for the regulatiori
of the conduct of the courts in deciding act of legislative bodies unconstitutional, namely, that -they should insist on the presence of a
full bench. This doubtless, is a sane rule. The largest court is
small in comparison with the law-making bodies, and there i,3
something approaching the grotesque in a small body of men overriding the work of a larger body, unless, as seldom happens, the
intellectual and moral character of the several components of the
former is greatly and perceptibly superior to that of* the components of the latter. When a circuit court of three judges or the
supreme court of nine, is going to annul a statute passed by Congress and the President, it is fit that all the judges should be present. However but little is gained by the presence of all the judges,
if in the end, a statute is overthrown by a bare majority of one or
two. The rule should be expanded so as to require that a court
should never pronounce the opinion of the Congress and the President as embodied in legislation, erroneous, until all its memberi
lad agreed in the judgment. The result of this simple rule would
be materially to lessen the number of condemned statutes, and to
free the subjects of the government from much of the harassing
uncertainty respecting their rights and duties under the law, which
now afflicts them, an object worthy of the anxious effort of statesman and jurist, business-man and scholar.
WILLIAM TRICKETT.
Const. Lim. 230.

THE FORUM

189

MOOT COURnT
BURROWS vs. R. R. Co.

Admission of Illegal Evidence-Requisites of a Valid Ordinance-Negligence per se-Ordinance Limiting Speed of Trains as Evidence
of Negligence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
An ordinance of the borough through which the railroad passed required the stationing of a flagman at a crossing and the slowing of the
speed of trains to ten miles an hour. This ordinance was not recorded
nor was it published. In an action by Burrows for damages to his wagon
which Was run into, In going over a crossing, by a train of defendant's
going 15 miles an hour, it was shown there was no flagman at the crossing. This ordinance was put in evidence by the plaintiff. Verdict for
plaintiff for $125. Motion for new trial.
Reed for the plaintiff.
1. A new trial will not be granted because of the admission of evidence which is clearly immaterial. Pepper & Lewis Digest of Decisions,
Vol. 13, Column 22949.
The running of a train at the speed of 15 miles per hour over the
crossing of the borough, as given in evidence in the present case, is entirely too great a rate of speed, and would constitute the railroad company
liable for damages in the present case had the ordinance not been put in
evidence, there being no contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff.
Phila. & Reading L R. Co. v. Lewis, 75 Pa. 257; Hagan v. Railroad,
5 Phila. 179; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33.
LaBar for the defendant.
The ordinance not being published or recorded was void. Aut May 23,
1893, P. & L. Col. 430; Lee v. Lewiset al., 7 Kulp 163; Trickett on Borough Law, Vol. 1, p. 134; Waln v. Phila., to use of Armstrong, 99 Pa.
330.
The speed of the train is not negligence per se. Lederman, et ux. v.
R. R. 165 Pa. 118; Penna R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33; Seifred v. R. R. 206
Pa. 339.
When illegal evidence has been admitted, a new trial should be granted. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 125 Pa. 265.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SMITH, RALPH, J.:-The contentions of the defendant are (1) the ordinance is void, not having been published as prescribed by statute, and
hence its admission in evidence is the admission of illegal evidence; (2)
the refusal of the court to withdraw from the jury illegal evidence improperly admitted in the progress of the trial is ground for a new trial.
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The question arises, admitting the evidence to have been admissable,
would or ought it to have varied the issue of the cause? Would its probable effects on the minds of the jury have been to produce a verdict of
guilty?
In Anderson vs. Railroad, 54 N. Y. 337 the court said that the reception
of illegal evidence is presumptively injurious to the party objecting to Its
admission; but when the presumption is repelled and it is clear beyond
rational doubt that no harm was done to the party objecting and the illegal
evidence did not or would not affect the results, the error furnishes no
ground for reversal. Troubat & Haly, Vol. 1., Sec. 774, lays down the rule
that the admission of improper evidence whenever it may have injured
a party is ground for a new trial though there was no exception. And ia
the cases cited under the same section it was held that the admission
of immaterial evidence is not ground for a new trial-Simibroth v. Lehr,
5 Phila. 87; a new trial will not be granted where irrelevant testimony
which may not have influenced the verdict has been received. Clark v.
Vorce, 19 Wendell 232.
We believe that if injustice was the result of the verdict because of
the admitted matter and the defence had no other redress than the medium
of a new trial a point might be stretched in the defendant's favor but as
to a mere technical difficulty when the verdict is consistent with the merits
there should be no reversal.
The ordinance of said borough prohibiting the operation of a train
within the limits of the borough at a rate of speed not exceeding ten miles
an hour was not unreasonable and with further proof should not be ground
for reversal. It did not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of showing himself free from contributory negligence Railroads are not negligent per se
for omissions to comply with ordinances where trespassers are killed on
their right of way. B. & 0. Railroad Co. v. State, 82 Md. 497.
Trains may be run at a high rate of speed to reach their greatest utility,
but in populous ftowns and cities the speed must be moderate. Under the
evidence it is for the jury t9 say whether the train was run too fast.
Lederman v. Railroad, 165 Pa. 118. Evidence that a city ordinance forbade
trains to be run at a higher rate of speed than five miles an hour may
be considered in ascertaining whether or not the train was being negligently run. but such ordinance in itself is no evidence of negligence. Ja
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33, there was no ordinance limiting the
rate of running at that point. There was evidence that the train was running at a high rate of speed. It was held that whether the train
was running at a rate of speed which was safe and prudent under the
circumstances was for the jury. Lane v. Atlantic Works, 11 Mass. 136.
In an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to bd caused by Iron
falling from the defendant's truck while carelessly left standing on the
street, the jury may consider, upon the question of the defndant's negligence, the fact that a city ordinance forbade trucks standing in the street.
From the line of cases, like to the one at bar, we have been able to
find on the question of the admission of an ordinance in evidence the prevailing rule In Pennsylvania seems to be that an ordinance is admissable:
however, in a number of other states the contrary rule is held and we
think with reason. The ordinance is the mere expression of the opinion rf
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the council for the municipality. If the ordinance will have any effect
whatever upon the jury in bringing about the verdict, and it undoubtedly
would be an aid to them in determining what was reasonable, it should
not be admitted.
We believe, however, even if the evidence was incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial, it was not such evidence as would have affected the verdict and warranted a new trial.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The ordinance requiring the stationing of a flagman at the crossing
and forbidding a greater speed -than ten miles per hour, was not recorded
nor published. The act of April 3, 1851 requires the council of a borough
to publish every ordinance in at least one newspaper and by not less than
twelve advertisements "at least ten days before the same shall take effect."
The ordinance does not yet have effect; Commonwealth v. Beaver Borough, 171 Pa. 542: Buchanan v. Beaver Borough, 171 Pa. 567. The penalties prescribed by it cannot be imposed. Its prohibitive virtue is in EJ
state of suspense.
As the ordinance could not be directly employed as the proof of a
duty, on the part of the railroad, in a proceeding to enforce the fine for a
breach of it, it ought to follow that it cannot be indirectly employed as
evidence of a duty, in a private litigation.
Had the ordinance been duly passed, recorded and published, it might
have been put in evidence, to show the negligence of the defendant; that
is, to show that impelling Its cars at a greater speed than ten miles per
hcur, was a negligent act. ItIs not, we are informed, "per se evidence of
negligence," Lederman v. Railroad, 165 Pa. 118, which, means probably,
that the greater speed than the prescribed, is not, simply because it Is
greater, negligent: that Is, though the rate violates the ordinance, it may
not be negligent. The prescribed rate "may be taken into consideration
by the jury with other evidence, in ascertaining whether" the speed was
too high. But how? Because people will rely on the railroads' observing
the ordinance, and then It would become negligent for it to exceed the
limit? Or because the ordinance expresses the opinion of authoritative
persons as to what Is a safe speed? The case does not enlighten us. In
Connor v. Traction Co., 173 Pa. 602, a collision between an east bound and
a south bound passenger car, at a crossing, the ordinance gave the right
of way to the south bound car when It was within forty feet of the crossng. The driver of tle east bound car- was killed. The widow of the deceased, alleged that the south bound car was more than forty feet from
the crossing, and therefore had not the right of way. The Supreme court
remark that failure to comply with such an ordinance Is not necessarily
negligence per se, it Is merely evidence of negligence; but how Is not explained. In Penna. Co. v. James, 81% Pa. 194, an ordinance limiting the
speed to five miles per hour, was put In evidence but the attention of the
court was attracted simply to the nuestion of the power of the city to
enact it. The trial court says that the violation of the ordinance. In running twenty to thirty miles per hour, and the neglect -to ring the bell, would
be negligence, but whether simply violating the ordinance would be, Is not
Intimated.
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We have on former occasions indicated dissent from the view that an
ordinance is receivable as evidence of negligence, in an action not founded
on the ordinance and to which the borough or city is not a party. If the
ordinance secured a right to individuals that the railroad should not violate it, the violation should give a cause of aption to them whenerver, but
for it, the accident 'would not have happened. But it does not do this.
It is only some evidence of negligence. It can be such evidence only as
it expresses the opinion of those who enact it, or who allow It to stand
unrepealed. The reception of opinion evidence as to what is a proper speed
is anomalous. Still more is the reception of an ordinance as the expression
of this opinion, those who pass it not being called into court, nor sworn,
nor subjected to examination. The practice of receiving such evidence
ought to be abolished.
But what was put in evidence in this case was not an ordinance, but
something which was merely on the way to become an ordinance. We are
unwilling to so extend the rule which admits ordinances as to make it embrace inchoate acts of municipal legislation
Judgment reversed.

LOGAN vs. SHAFER.

Rescission of Contract for Sale of Personalty-Re-sale-Breach
-Non-erformance-Recovery

of Part

of Contract

Payment-Damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Logan contracted with Shafer on January 17th, 1905, to buy of Shafer
150 hogs at $5.00 per hundred weight.
They were to be weighed and delivered on February 1st, and then paid
for.
Logan advanced $250.00 on account on January 24th.
Shafer was ready to deliver the hogs on February 1st, but Logan did
not appear and claim, or pay for them.
Shafer kept them two weeks, when, finding another purchaser, he sold
them for $250.00 more than Logan had agreed to pay.
Logan sues to get back the $250.00.
Barner for the plaintiff.

Where in a contract for the sale of personalty the vendee does not
accept the goods, the vendor may consider the contract rescinded and resell the goods and recover from the vendee his damages. Guard vs. Taggert, 5 S. & R_ 19; McCombs vs. McKennan, 2 W. & S. 216; Miller vs.
Phillips, 31 Pa. 218.
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The party rescinding the contract where there has been no delivery
of goods must return the consideration in whole or in part which he has received under it. Beetem vs. Burkholder, 69 Pa. 249; Bush vs. Bender, 113
Pa. 94
McAfee for the defendant.
The payment of the purchase money was a condition precedent for
title to pass.
OPINION

OF THE COURT.

JOHNSON, J.:-In Cleveland and company vs. Sterret, 70 Pa.204, the
defendants agreed "to deliver to the plaintiffs at their works at Mill Creek
or on their platform at the railroad 240 barrels of oil" of the quality named
etc.. "any time betwen July 1st and lecember 1st" on the plaintiffs "giving
ten days notice at his option;" the plaintiff to pay thirty-six cents per gallon, etc. $1,000 to be paid July 1st, $1,000 on August 1st, and the balance
on delivery. It was held by the court that the defendants were to be
the actors, and were to be ready to deliver the oil at one of the places
named on December 1st, unless plaintiff by his option had demanded an
earlier delivery. The plaintiff paid $2,000. Defendants not being ready to
deliver on December 1st, the plaintiff might'rescind and recover back the
money he had paid. The defendants not being ready to comply with their
contract could not demand the money from the plaintiff, nor recover damages for his refusal to receive the oil after the first of December.
In the present case it would seem that the defendant Shafer was entirely ready to deliver at the place named in the contract and at the appointed time; also the quantity, which by the contract, was to be measured
by weight, had been duly ascertained by Shafer, thus taking the case out of
Nesbit vs. Burry, 25 Pa. 208, and Cleveland vs. Sterret, supra.
Shafer did more . He kept the hogs two weeks, presumably awaiting
Logan's appearance and claim. It can hardly be said Lhat it was Shafer's
duty to pilot the hogs about the country in search of Logan, or to go himself
on a pilgrimage of discovery for the missing purchaser, nor could he be
expected to keep the hogs forever, in hope Logan would come back; the
contract is explicit and affords abundance of notice to Logan; Rowland
vs. Lehigh Coal Co., 28 Pa. 215; Cleveland or Sterret, supra and Musselman
vs. Stoner, 31 Pa. 265.
It seems clear to us that Logan, by his action rescinded the contract.
Therefore Shafer could have brought an action for damages. He does not
seem to have cared to pursue this course. Instead he keeps the $250 Logan
advanced "on account." We do not understand by what authority he resolves himself into a Board of appraisers that may call upon this $250 advancement of this plaintiff to relieve his disappointment and injury in failing to dispose to a certain party certain valuable hogs. In truth, his pecuniary damage could hardly have reached his ultimate profit.
Looking at the case from another view-point; Shafer has seen fit to
treat this whole transaction as "no sale" to .ogan, (part payment will not
vest the ownership in the vendee, Welsh vs. Bell, 32 Pa. 12.) Logan seems
glad to do likewise. If this is so, how does the $250 become the property
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of Shafer? It was to be used in a sale. It was to become the property
of Shafer upon a consummated sale. There was no sale. Is it not the
property of Logan?
We believe the $250 in question should be returned to Logan. If Shafer
has a claim against a portion of it, or even all of it, he will find his remedy
in a proper action at law.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The contract made January 17th did not pass the property in the hogs
to Logan. They were to be weighed and paid for on February 1st, and then
delivered. The ownership did not pass until these things were done.
Thompson v. Franks, 37 Pa. 327; Nieholson vs. Taylor, 31 Pa. 128. The
payment of the price did not cause it to pass; Nesbit vs. Burry, 25 Pa. 208.
The second purchaser became the owner.
We are not required to consider whether, by the second sale, Shafer
violated any right of Logan. He is not sued for a breach of contract and
he could not be sued for conversion of or trespass on the hogs, as Logan's.
$250 were paid to Shafer, as a part of the price of the hogs. Shafer
having sold them to another, 'cannot retain the money. If the failure of,
Logan to take and pay for the hogs at the time designated in the contract,
was, as it doubtless was, a breach of it, he would be liable for actual damages. But, it does not appear that any such damages have been suffered.
Shafer sold the hogs for $250 more than Logan had agreed to pay. The
expense of keeping them two weeks, and other expense being deducted,
there would probably still remain with Shafer a considerable gain from
Logan's breach of his contract. If he were allowed to keep the $250 obtained from Logan, he would profit almost to the extent of $500 by Logan's
breach.
Judgment affirmed,

